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Introduction to Access to Third Party Infrastructure 
in Offshore Projects: A Comparative Approach 
David H. Sweeney 
All exploration and production projects are, to some extent, 
infrastructure-dependent. As the ultimate goal of any such project is profit, 
a hydrocarbon reservoir, once discovered and appraised, must be 
monetized. Monetization, in turn, generally requires some measure of 
processing—for example, to remove impurities—and transportation, 
whether through pipes, trucks, shuttle tankers, or otherwise. Thus, a 
simplified development schematic for an offshore gas field might include 
(1) tieback to a platform on which sulphur, carbon dioxide, and other 
impurities are stripped out of raw gas, liquids are separated, and the gas is 
otherwise made ready for transportation and ultimate sale; (2) 
compression of the processed “dry” gas into an export line; and (3) 
transport of that gas to an onshore sales point. Without the intermediate 
steps between production and sale, no viable project would exist. 
The same is generally true of a given onshore field. However, offshore 
infrastructure is typically more expensive, extensive, and complex, and 
requires a greater degree of planning, sometimes in volatile markets in 
which the investor cannot ensure that hydrocarbon prices will support the 
continuation of a project from one budgeting period to the next. 
Furthermore, longer planning, fabrication, and installation times required 
for offshore infrastructure can lead to longer cycle times between project 
sanction, the payment of costs, and first commercial production.1 This 
front-loading of costs can reduce the economic appeal of a project that 
requires significant new infrastructure. 
Offshore reservoirs are especially sensitive to infrastructure-related 
costs through project sanction or final investment decision. Even a 
relatively large and otherwise economically attractive, offshore project 
can quickly be rendered uneconomic due to, for example, the costs 
required to fabricate a production system, such as a floating production 
storage and offloading unit. If each project required new material 
infrastructure, the subset of commercially viable offshore hydrocarbon 
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 1. See, e.g., Preston Cody, Shale vs. Big Exploration: What Sorts of Risks Are 
You Taking?, E&P Jan. 1, 2013, http://www.epmag.com/item/Shale-vs-big-
exploration_111180 [perma.cc/3TRU-4XWF] (discussing conventional resource 
project cycle times and their relationship with unconventional resource cash flows). 
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development projects would likely be much smaller than it is. Therefore 
stakeholders in offshore projects, including governments, have an interest 
in reducing infrastructure costs.2 One of the major ways to accomplish this 
goal is by utilizing existing infrastructure, some or all of which may be 
owned by third parties that are not investors in the project seeking access 
to such infrastructure, or by one or more investors in such infrastructure in 
percentages that differ from their respective cost and revenue interests in 
such project.3 
In theory, such access would go a long way toward minimizing 
infrastructure costs and maximizing project value and, by extension, 
project development. However, the interests of infrastructure owners on 
the one hand, and those of the upstream project stakeholder seeking access 
on the other, are not necessarily aligned. Owners of infrastructure 
fabricated for a particular project may seek, among other things, 
recompense for operating expenses relating to such infrastructure, a return 
on capital expenditures, and a reservation of capacity in a facility for that 
project as well as other upstream projects in which they hold an interest.4 
Left to its own devices, an infrastructure owner might not allow access 
for third party production for any number of reasons, including lack of 
capacity, disagreement on the legal and economic terms on which access 
would be granted, inability to handle the type of production for which 
access is proposed, and the desire not to enrich a company that is likely to 
be a competitor. The use, or increased use, of a facility generally brings 
greater risks of liability and damage and faster rates of depreciation and 
mechanical breakdown. Investing companies risk capital in the fabrication 
and installation of infrastructure for an owned project but do not necessarily 
have an incentive to allow a competitor access to that infrastructure—likely, 
to some extent, to the detriment of the project for which the infrastructure 
                                                                                                             
 2. See Ernest E. Smith, Typical World Petroleum Arrangements, in INST. ON 
INT’L RES. LAW: A BLUEPRINT FOR MINERAL DEV. 9-1, 9-21 (ROCKY MTN. MIN. 
L. FOUND., Feb. 1991) (discussing a grantor’s interest in encouraging petroleum 
resource development). 
 3. See Canadian Ass’n of Petroleum Landmen, 2007 CAPL Operating 
Procedure, § 14.02 (2007) (providing for the deletion of infrastructure from the 
operating agreement after it reaches a certain level of cost or complexity). 
 4. See, e.g., OIL & GAS UK, CODE OF PRACTICE ON ACCESS TO UPSTREAM OIL 
AND GAS INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE UK CONTINENTAL SHELF § 5.2 (Nov. 2012) 
(espousing agreements based on “fair and reasonable tariffs and terms, where risks 
taken are reflected by rewards”) [hereinafter OGUK]; see also AM. ASS’N OF PROF’L 
LANDMEN, Form 810 § 16.8 (2007), AM. ASS’N OF PROF’L LANDMEN, Form 710 § 
13.9 (2002), and ASS’N OF INT’L PETROLEUM NEGOTIATORS § 7.9 (2012) (discussing 
platform and facility usage by third parties and owners with disproportionate interests, 
including depreciation and investment recovery charges and per unit of production 
throughput charges). 
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was built—on terms that would allow the competitor’s project to go 
forward. 
However, the grantors of hydrocarbon resources, which, with respect 
to offshore projects, are generally governmental authorities,5 have an 
interest in encouraging the development, monetization, and use of 
hydrocarbon reserves.6 Infrastructure costs exert a negative impact on 
hydrocarbon project evaluation, and thus development, leaving reserves 
“stranded.” Conversely, lack of access to existing facilities can result in 
construction of infrastructure where none is physically necessary, with 
potentially detrimental environmental impacts.7 Thus, grantors have an 
incentive to encourage—or require—facility owners to permit third party 
access and throughput in certain circumstances. This situation would 
suggest a mandatory access regime, or perhaps one in which the grantor 
owns or controls facilities and determines access thereto. However, this 
solution would ultimately be counterproductive, as it would tend to 
discourage investors to commit risk capital to infrastructure projects over 
which they would ultimately have little control or upside. Investment in 
exploration and production projects (including related facilities) is 
generally at the sole risk of the developing investors.8 A company faced 
with billions of dollars worth of infrastructure expenditures and years 
worth of design, engineering, fabrication, and related costs, project delays, 
and other attendant risks, will be more likely to evaluate a project 
negatively if it cannot retain some—or exclusive—ownership over the 
benefits of such infrastructure. 
This fundamental tension results in a balancing act between the 
interests of facility owners, project stakeholders, and grantors. In any 
event, different jurisdictions have different approaches to economic 
matters, so it should not be surprising that access to third party 
infrastructure for exploration projects is no exception. Third party access 
regimes can be viewed along a continuum, with systems in which the 
government cannot compel third party access on one end and systems 
mandating open and non-discriminatory access on the other. Of course, 
                                                                                                             
 5. Smith, supra note 2, at 9-21. 
 6. UK DEP’T OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, GUIDANCE ON DISPUTES 
OVER THIRD PARTY ACCESS TO UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS INFRASTRUCTURE para. 
9 (July 2013) [hereinafter DECC]. 
 7. See id. at para. 45 (“The Government has sought to avoid the unnecessary 
proliferation of pipelines and other infrastructure. Access to existing infrastructure on 
fair and reasonable terms is therefore important for third parties.”). 
 8. See, e.g., CLAUDE DUVAL ET AL., INT’L PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND 
EXPLOITATION AGREEMENTS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC & POLICY ASPECTS 69–70 
(Barrows Co. 2d. ed. 2009) (discussing this concept in the context of a production 
sharing contract). 
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most access systems represent compromises between the ideals embodied 
by these two extremes. Furthermore, different access rules may apply to 
different types of infrastructure. This article examines access to third party 
infrastructure by analyzing the regimes governing access to platforms 
(including related processing and handling equipment) and pipelines in the 
United States sector of the Gulf of Mexico and the United Kingdom and 
Norwegian sectors of the North Sea. 
A detailed analysis of each system follows. To provide a general 
summary, access on the Norwegian Continental Shelf and United 
Kingdom Continental Shelf is either “open” or negotiated, but delimited 
by a “backstop” appeals process to a governmental entity with the 
authority, if rarely used, to force access.9 This system is analogous to 
access in the United States portion of the Gulf of Mexico, at least with 
respect to pipeline access.10 In practice, however, open access rules in the 
Gulf of Mexico and the corresponding governmental appeals process is 
poorly defined and rarely exercised. Furthermore, while purported 
standards for access exist, such as the American Association of 
Professional Landmen’s model forms of Production Handling 
Agreement,11 those forms lack the wide industry acceptance of, for 
example, the Oil & Gas U.K.’s “Infrastructure Code of Practice.”12 Thus, 
the United States can be seen to employ more of a “negotiated access” 
system, while the United Kingdom and Norway can be seen as having 
more elements of “open” access or “negotiated” access with resort to 
government to determine disputes. 
These rules are covered in greater detail in the articles that follow, but 
are summarized in the following chart. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 9. The United Kingdom committed their access system to law through the 
Energy Act of 2011, § 82, et seq.; Norway enacted a similar access framework 
through the Petroleum Act of 1996 §§ 4-8 and 4-9. 
 10. See, e.g., Open and Nondiscriminatory Access to Oil and Gas Pipelines 
Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 30 C.F.R. §§ 291.1–291.115 (2015) 
(providing a legal structure to ensure open and non-discriminatory access to 
pipelines). 
 11. These forms are available from the OCS Advisory Board in both 
deepwater and shelf versions. See Documents and Resources, OUTER CONT’L 
SHELF ADVISORY BD., https://ocsadvisoryboard.org/documents [perma.cc/BQ84-
TDTY] (last visited Dec. 24, 2015). 
 12. See generally OGUK, supra, note 4. 
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Issue  United Kingdom United 
States 
Norway 
Access system 
(pipe) 
Negotiated  Regulated Regulated  
Access method 
(platform/other) 
Negotiated—
with right to appeal 
Negotiated Negotiated— 
duty to 
negotiate 
with right to 
appeal 
Standardized 
T&Cs 
In part In part —
AAPL PHA 
Yes 
Information (pipe) Open Open Open 
Information 
(other) 
Open Closed Closed 
Can government 
compel access? 
Yes In part— 
OCSLA open-
access 
regulations on 
pipe 
Yes 
Can owners be 
compelled to 
expand facilities? 
Yes In part—
OCSLA open-
access 
regulations on 
pipe 
Yes 
Governmental 
policy to delay 
decommissioning? 
Yes No Yes 
 
